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Abstract:  
This paper looks at the export developments of Vietnamese garment producers after the 
Multi-Fibre Arrangement was removed by the beginning of 2005. It uses a Global Value 
Chain approach and analyses what happens when there is a major change in the 
institutional context, in this case shift in the basic institutional international trade 
arrangements. The focus is on Vietnam and the Vietnamese garment suppliers looking 
at how they have performed after the removal of the quota systems and what kind of 
strategies they have pursued. The results show that Vietnamese suppliers have been 
able to compete internationally after the quota removals although many of them appear 
to be locked in the low value end of the chain. The data show, however, that they are not 
only able to compete and grow but also to change between buyers and markets, which 
provides them with the flexibility of shifting between chains.  
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1 A first draft of the paper was presented at the 2nd Aalborg University Conference on 
Internationalisation of Companies and Intercultural Management, October 2006. The paper has its 
background in the cooperative Vietnamese-Denmark International Business research project 
(www.vdibresearch.org.vn) under which the author worked together with a team of researchers from 
Foreign Trade University in Hanoi. The research team included Mrs. Huong Pham Thu, Mr. Tien Dao 
Ngoc and Mrs. Hai Nguyen Thi Hong who are all acknowledged for their contribution and dedication. 
The research team collected and processed the data from the Vietnamese garment firms. 
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Introduction 
The opportunities for developing country firms to be integrated in cross border trade 
relations depend today to a large extent on international trade arrangements.  When the 
analytical framework of global commodity chains (GCC) was introduced by Gerald 
Gereffi, he used four dimensions to explain the organisation of such chains: Input-
output relations, location, governance and the institutional context (Gereffi 1994). By 
context he meant the national and international institutional setting that outside the 
direct control of the stakeholders influences the way the GCC is organised. In the recent 
work on global value chains (GVC) the context has faded away (Gereffi et al. 2005). At 
a similar note, the strategic options of the producing suppliers have not been the direct 
focus of the GCC and GVC analysis; the emphasis has been on the lead firm governing 
the chain and the governance of the relations to its suppliers. In this paper we will look 
at the supplying firm and see how it reacts to changes in the institutional context and 
form its strategy in the garment GVC. We will see how Vietnamese garment producers 
reacted when the quota system of the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) was abolished and 
a new global competitive framework emerged for trade in garments.    
 
The MFA trade regime in textile and garment was phased out with the WTO Agreement 
on Textile and Clothing (ATC) by the end of 2004. For garment producers in many 
developing countries it meant a new more competitive global environment. Where the 
MFA system had secured national producers export quotas, and thereby an opportunity 
to become integrated in global value chains, they were now faced with a more open 
competitive environment and a risk of lead firms shifting their orders to the globally 
most competitive suppliers. There was an expectation that garment export from China 
would explode because Chinese producers were more effective producing better 
qualities at cheaper prices. Other production locations would face falling market shares 
as buyers abandoned them.  
 
As expected China’s export increased to such an extent that both the US and EU by the 
middle of 2005 reintroduced restrictions on their garment import from China making 
room for other countries to benefit and fill the gap left by China in a global market with 
increased demand for garments. The upsurge in Chinese exports immediately after the 
end to the MFA and the swift intervention by the EU and the US, resulting in 
agreements to restrict export growth, are clear indications that the market cannot 
provide what is termed “a level playing field”. Policy driven regulations efforts will 
continue using WTO provisions of “unfair” and “unjust” market developments. 
 
 In Vietnam the garment industry has been one of the main successes behind the 
country’s export driven growth strategy over more than ten years. Vietnam only became 
a member of WTO early in 2007 and its trade in garments was therefore regulated by 
bilateral agreements when the MFA quota system terminated. A main shift for 
Vietnam’s export took place when the US market opened after a virtual trade boycott 
with the bilateral trade agreement (BTA) signed in 2002. 
 
Up to the end of 2004 Vietnam was faced with quota systems for its garment export to 
both EU and US. Only the quota system with the EU was abolished together with the 
MFA while the system imposed by the US continued. Nevertheless the relatively more 
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open global trade regime for garments could mean that producers in Vietnam were 
faced with stiffer competition on their main markets particularly from China. Would the 
steep export growth stop and the country see a decline in its export of garments?  
 
This study raises the question: What has been the strategy and how have Vietnamese 
garment producers performed after the end of the ATC? 
 
The second section of this paper looks at the effect of liberalisation of the garment 
market from a theoretical point of view that reflect the changes in the trade environment 
situation, and section three provides an overview of the structure of the Vietnamese 
garment industry, its performance and competitive strength. The fourth section 
discusses the strategic options for the firms in the GVCs while the following section 
shows the performance of the industry after the ATC by first analyzing trade figures at 
industry level and thereafter presenting and analyzing preliminary findings from a 
survey of 34 garment firms in Vietnam before the conclusions are made in the final 
section. 
Theoretical reflections on the effects of garment market liberalisation 
Moving from a quota regulated trade regime to a liberalised one should according to a 
simple neo-classical economic argument lead to a change in trade flows from the less to 
the more price competitive producers ceteris paribus. Since the quota systems for 
garment imports to US and EU in particular have been quite elaborate allocating quotas 
to a large number of developing countries with significant variations in price 
competitiveness, it was envisaged that the removal of quotas would lead to a major 
reorganisation of the trade flows and shifts in the garment exports composition among 
the exporting developing countries. The widespread expectation was that well 
established export countries with large capacities such as China and India would gain 
while many smaller developing countries that had mainly come into the global garment 
value chains because of the quota systems would loose (Tewari 2006). Furthermore, the 
theoretical prediction will be that freer trade will lead buyers to pressure prices 
downward. Such shifts will have large repercussions on production and employment of 
the concerned countries.  
 
In anticipation of these impacts, a lot of interest and concern was raised about who are 
likely to win and who will loose?2 The outcome from these discussions reveals a more 
varied picture than the above trade theory argument. From the buyers point of view not 
only price but also a whole range of other competitive factors are important such as 
quality, delivery-speed and -certainty, production flexibility, and transport time and 
costs (Palpaceur et al. 2005). Development of various capabilities like skills, 
management practices, networking, etc. which are important at the firm level appear not 
only to vary between regions but also among firms within the same country (Tewari 
2006). These factors together with other risk elements may be accommodated in neo-
classical theory but it certainly makes the international buyers sourcing strategies more 
complicated and trade streams will not necessarily be diverted to the most price 
competitive suppliers. In addition to the competitive factors a range of other strategic 
considerations are made by the buyers. First of all, location considerations will make 
                                                 
2 See http://www.tradeforum.org/ and http://www.ethicaltrade.org  
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large buyers in particular assess country risks and spread orders to different countries to 
avoid a situation where unexpected developments in one country can harm the entire 
supply. Secondly, there can be substantial exit and shifting costs abandoning suppliers 
in one country and shifting to new ones in other countries.  
 
When it comes to the discussion of who stands to win and who stands to loose, the 
overall assessment and fear for most producing countries has been that China will take 
it all. China has already become global leader in garment export in most product 
categories because its producers on average are the most competitive both with respect 
to price and quality. However, if we take the other competitive parameters and strategic 
considerations into account, the picture may be less obvious. Buyers may not want to 
put all their orders in China. Infrastructure problems in China are rising, wages are 
rising and the garment sector is not politically a priority sector in China, and 
furthermore some suppliers may see a country risk in placing all their eggs in the China 
basket. Therefore the broader picture says that there are still substantial opportunities 
for effective producers outside China.  
 
However, institutional trade arrangements will also continue to protect less effective 
producers in other countries. These arrangements include producers in importing 
countries including developed countries. Soon after the free trade regime was 
introduced January 1st, 2005, political attention was raised about on the huge import 
surge from China into the US and EU, resulting in the introduction of export restraints 
agreements with China for garment exports. Furthermore, preferential trade 
arrangements for specific developing countries are still allowed creating preferential 
access to the EU market and under the African Growth and Opportunity Act scheme for 
producers in African countries to the US market. 
Profile and development of the garment industry in Vietnam 
Textile-garment is a fast-growing industry in Vietnam, constituting around 11% of 
manufacturing production. The garment exports have over several years shown double-
digit annual growth rates. In the last couple of years, export figures have exploded and 
reached USD 4.4 billion in 2005 up from USD 1.9 billion in 2001. The increase has 
mainly been a result of the opening of the US market after the bilateral trade agreement 
(BTA) entering into force in 2001, but because of the steep growth, the US reintroduced 
quotas for the import from Vietnam from early 2003. Main markets for Vietnam’s 
garment exports had earlier been Japan without quotas and the EU with quotas. 
 
Both the textile and the garment sub-sectors have expanded production significantly 
over the last 15 years. The textile sector was initially larger than the garment sector, in 
terms of both employment and output, but the garment sector has expanded most and is 
now dominant one (Hill, 2000; Thoburn et al., 2002). Today, Vietnam is a large net 
importer of textiles catering for the inputs to the export garment sector. The garment 
industry in Vietnam is concentrated around Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) and Hanoi 
where special industrial zones for textile-garment companies have been established. 
While there are some cluster characteristics for the industry, the diverse ownership 
structure is important. In 2003, there were 1,206 registered firms in the garment 
industry (excluding household enterprises and textile firms): 120 were state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs); 800 were private domestic-owned and most of them recently 
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established enterprises; and 278 had 100% or joint venture foreign ownership. The 
SOEs include large corporations that consist of many different enterprises located all 
over the country. VINATEX, formed in 1995, is the largest state-owned textile-garment 
corporation, covering 45 member enterprises that are horizontally and vertically 
integrated, including specialised support and trade companies. The SOEs have generally 
better machinery and equipment than the private firms, and they have a divisional 
organisational structure with a relatively large number of technical middle managers, 
which makes the decision-making structure cumbersome and inefficient. The SOEs 
continue to expand, although some are going through not a privatisation but a 
equitisation process, where the company is transformed to a shareholding company but 
often the state will maintain a controlling part of the shares. While most of the SOEs are 
concentrated in the North, the private domestic-owned firms are concentrated around 
HCMC and dominated by garment firms that tend to be medium-sized. For the private 
companies state connections play an important role, and in HCMC one finds both 
companies with owners from North Vietnam and firms owned by Vietnamese of 
Chinese origin. Many of them are owner-managed firms with a concentrated top 
management structure that keeps direct track of all company functions and is able to 
take quick decisions. Companies with foreign ownership have the highest productivity, 
and in the garment sector they produce almost exclusively for export. While 100%-
owned FDI today is allowed, a substantial part of the early foreign investments in the 
industry was established as joint ventures with SOEs, but in 2003 240 firms were 100% 
foreign owned. The foreign investors are primarily from East Asia. 
  
Before 1991, SOEs exported garments to the Soviet and East European markets. Since 
then the garment enterprises in all three sectors have been integrated in global garment 
value chains in various ways. Buyers are a) regional producers, mainly from Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and South Korea, sourcing from their own plants or from independent 
suppliers in Vietnam constituting a triangular GVC with buyers in developed countries; 
b) traders, mainly from Hong Kong and elsewhere in the region, sourcing 
“commissioned garments” for overseas buyers; and c) foreign retailers with their own 
brands sourcing directly in Vietnam. The organisation of the export production is 
concentrated on two modes: one assembling (cut, make and trim, CMT) and the second, 
variations of the own equipment manufacturing (OEM) (known in Vietnam as Free-On-
Board (FOB) 1 and 2), where the local producer to varying degree sources fabrics and 
accessories (MPDF, 2000; Thoburn et al., 2002; Nadvi & Thoburn, 2004). The 
vertically integrated SOEs source more materials of their own compared to the private 
enterprises, which are more dependent on their buyers either supplying inputs or 
specifying to them the foreign fabrics and accessories suppliers from which they have to 
source (Van, 2003). The domestic market, with 80 million people, is also expanding fast 
as a result of a growing real per capita income. A large household production sector has 
traditionally catered for low-end products, while SOEs in particular have made well-
known brand products for the domestic market. The new private firms produce 
relatively little for the domestic market. Despite custom duties there is fierce 
competition from Chinese imported products, much of which are apparently smuggled 
across the border. 
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Strategic Options for Local Garment Producers 
Although expanding fast, the Vietnamese garment producers are still locked into a 
rather static supplier position in the garment GVC with difficulties of upgrading in the 
value chain being dependent on the foreign buyers’ design, specifications and standards 
at the same time as buyers maintain full control over marketing. Most domestic 
producers are able to supply several buyers in different markets at the same time and the 
dominant strategy is therefore growth through expanded production volumes. The SOEs 
usually have more buyers than private companies and an aspiration to produce up-
market and brand products. But there is little knowledge about the success of these 
strategies. Domestic producers are being certified according to various international 
standards or fulfil private ones in order to attract more up-market production orders. 
  
More seriously, in a long-term perspective, the industry is also found to have low 
productivity compared, for example, to China because of poor organisation of 
production and a lack of updated equipment (MPDF, 2000; Van, 2003). It is predicted 
that large investments in equipment and human resources are needed for the industry to 
compete in a liberal international environment. With respect to profits and earnings, it is 
said that assembling producers in particular are being squeezed by the international 
competition and that profits are falling (Thoburn et al., 2002; Knutsen, 2004), but the 
evidence is limited. On the other hand, employment, real wages and new investments 
are all increasing (Thoburn et al., 2002; Nadvi & Thoburn, 2004).  
 
Seen in a GVC governance perspective domestic private firms are primarily locked in 
the assembly mode and SOEs more in OEM types of captive relations with their buyers. 
For the private suppliers, this can be seen as a cost-competitive strategy with the great 
risk of producers being locked in at the lowest end of the value chain where 
opportunities are few (Tewari 2006). However, trade figures alone do show some 
dynamics. The turn to serve the US market after 2001 was quick, and offered stable and 
high volume sales. The challenge for the domestic firms is the production from the 
foreign firms located in Vietnam where the productivity is much higher than in 
domestic private companies and SOEs. The foreign garment firms now have the largest 
export performance.   
Vietnamese garment producers’ export performance after ATC 
Overall the Vietnamese garment industry showed a new export record of USD 4.8 
billion in 2005 - a growth of 9.5% compared to the year before. Significantly lower than 
the years before but far from a decrease that some feared. To identify the reasons behind 
the continued export growth we will start analysing the overall industry export figures 
by looking at the performance at the main export markets as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Vietnams garment exports to main markets 2000-2005 in millions USD 
Market 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Growth 
2004-2005 
US 50 45 951 1,973 2,474 2,640 6.7% 
EU 609 599 570 580 763 875 14.7% 
Japan 620 588 521 514 531 605 14.0% 
Others 614 730 710 587 618 680 10.0% 
Total  1,892 1,962 2,752 3,654 4,386 4,800 9.5% 
Source: Vietnam Textile and Apparel Association (VITAS) www.vntextile.com 
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The growth rate of 9.5% inn 2005 was significantly lower than the preceding three 
years. The overall increase in these years was, however, almost exclusively a result of 
the steep growth in the export to the US market in the years after the BTA was signed. 
An increase from almost nothing to USD 2.74 billion in 2004 or 56% of Vietnam’s total 
garment export. The US quotas introduced in 2003 moderated the growth in 2005 to 
6.7%. Competitors in China in were faced with export quotas to the US market by the 
middle 2005. Only in the first part of the year, could Chinese products enjoy free 
entrance to the US market while most of its competitors had free access except the 
Vietnamese producers who were restricted the whole year limiting the growth to the 
agreed increases in the quotas decided under the BTA, because Vietnam had still not 
finalised its inclusion in the WTO. If we look at the overall garment import to the US 
market for 2004 and 2005 we have the results shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 United States imports of apparel (in billions USD) 
   Import share 
 2004 2005 2004 2005 
Vietnam 2.562 2.725     4.0%   4.0% 
China 8.928 15.143    13.8%  22.0% 
Rest world 53.278 50.845    82.3%  74.0% 
World 64.768 68.713 100% 100% 
Source: Major Shippers Report: U.S. Imports by Category, September 8, 2006. Available at 
http://www.otexa.ita.doc.gov/msr/catV1.htm. Note import figures for Vietnam are a little different from 
the export figures shown in Table 1. 
 
The increase in overall import of garment to the US market from 2004 to 2005 was 
close to 5.5%. The increase in imports from China was substantially higher in spite of 
the restrictions imposed during the year. Overall China increased its market share of 
garment imports to the US by more than 50% in 2005 taking away a substantial part of 
others exporters share taken together, meaning that many countries must have 
experienced an absolute decline in their garment export to the US market in 2005. 
Vietnamese producers together maintained their share with an overall increase of about 
6.3% in the US import; a figure that shows the producers ability to compete within the 
overall allocated quota ceiling. Had they not been able to compete with China, the now 
unilateral ceilings posed on them would not have protected them.  
 
The export in 2005 to the EU market where Vietnamese producers now had free access 
showed the highest increase that year of 14.7%; lower than the growth in 2004, but 
much higher than in the previous four years, when the export to EU was almost 
stagnant. The Chinese competitors were faced with restrictions which must have 
benefited Vietnams’ producers. However, for Japan, a market with free imports from 
both Vietnam and China, Vietnams export resurged with a 14% growth after a steep fall 
from 2000 to 2004. 
 
The overall assessment of the trade data shows that 2005 did not see a stagnation of 
Vietnamese garment export but demonstrated a significant change in growth rates for 
the different main export markets. Vietnam appears to have been able to compete on 
freer market terms but first of all, the producers have been able to shift their production 
towards buyers on other markets than earlier where the US buyers were more 
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dominating. We will now look at the micro level of how garment firms have reacted and 
managed under the changed conditions in 2005. 
Garment firms’ performance and strategies 
The survey of garment firms took place in spring 2006 where 270 garment export 
companies were randomly selected and sent a questionnaire about their export 
performance and strategy in 2005. As expected few companies returned the 
questionnaire on their own. The companies who had received the questionnaires were 
therefore directly approached and assisted in filling out the questionnaire. So far we 
have surveys results from 34 garment companies; 21 from the North region (Hanoi), 7 
from Central and 6 from South (HCMC) and 74% of them have more than five years 
export experience. The respondents include 14 SOEs, 12 domestic private owned 
companies and eight companies with foreign ownership.3 In a strategic perspective it is 
important to note that the survey confirms that most firms supplied to several customers 
at different markets and also used different export modes. They sold for example both 
directly to overseas retailers predominant at the US market and to foreign buyers 
represented in Vietnam. Whether a result of strategic intention or not, the garment 
producers are included in global garment chains for various markets in different ways at 
the same time, and not locked in with a single buyer or at a single market. They 
obviously have a capacity to manage relations to different buyers and possess 
potentially a room for strategic maneuvering. On the other hand, the companies are still 
predominantly using foreign brands and their contracts assembly based (CMT) or in the 
low end of OEM activities. The use of active marketing efforts was not frequent and 
mostly limited to activities through trade promotion organisations.  
 
When asked in what direction exports had moved in 2005 compared to 2004 within ten 
product groups to the four main markets (US, EU, Japan and other markets) the result 
was that on average export had grown in all categories at all markets except for two 
products for the Japanese market and one for other markets. Significant increases were 
most predominant for products exported to the US and EU markets. The increased level 
of exports in 2005 was accompanied by an expansion of the companies’ capacity 
compared to 2004. A significant number of the firms has employed more permanent 
staff, increased their registered capital and their production capacity. On average the 
firms viewed their competitive position with respect to quality, delivery time and 
technology as better than comparable foreign companies but not with respect to price. 
 
Trying to look into what changes had taken place from 2004 to 2005 with respect to 
production management and strategy of the firms, we asked about changes in their 
contract arrangements and materials sourcing. The preliminary assessment of the data 
shows predominantly constant arrangements with a tendency towards a little more 
advanced form of assembly and OEM contracts but when asked about their sourcing of 
                                                 
3 The survey was undertaken as part of a research cooperation project, the Vietnam-Denmark 
International Business research programme, where a team of researchers from Foreign Trade University 
(FTU) in Hanoi consisting of Mrs. Huong Pham Thu, Mr. Tien Dao Ngoc and Mrs. Hai Nguyen Thi 
Hong together with the author undertook the survey. The 270 garment export companies were randomly 
selected from the yellow pages website for businessmen-vietbig business directory www.vietbig.com. 
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materials and accessories they seemed equally dependent on their buyers as the year 
before. Asked about barriers for expansion of their business the answers from the firms 
showed that only the allocation of quotas (for the US market) and access to working 
capital were perceived significant. 
 
Finally, the firms were asked directly about their strategies where the majority of firms 
pursued product upgrading, searched for new customers and markets and strengthened 
their design capabilities. They seem to be passive price takers with no intention of using 
price as a parameter, and there was no clear sign of a changing strategy with respect to 
sourcing of materials. 
Conclusion 
When we look at how Vietnamese garment firms have performed in 2005 after the 
MFA quota systems were abolished both the aggregated trade data and the firm level 
data confirm that their export has increased. What that precisely means with respect to 
their international competitiveness is not that clear because the international trade 
regime in garments continues to be characterised by interventions and restrictions. But 
in the present environment Vietnam has been able to continue its export expansion 
although at a lower rate and maintained its import share in its most important export 
market in the US. Although Vietnam has not been able to follow China’s export 
increase and gain of market share, this nevertheless indicates that it has maintained its 
strong export development in 2005 while other countries must have lost. 
 
With respect to the Vietnamese firms’ position in the garment GVCs they are still 
clearly locked into low end CMT and OEM positions although they have strategic 
intents to use their design and product upgrading capabilities. Their strategic room for 
maneuvering is, however, most predominant with respect to their flexibility to shift their 
operation to serve new customers and new markets with new products. Their 
performance in 2005 clearly demonstrates that the garment firms are able to pursue 
these options successfully and expand their performance. 
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